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Abstract 1 
We investigated whether nonhuman great apes (N=23), 2.5-year-old (N=20), and 3-year-old 2 
children (N=40) infer causal relations from patterns of variation and covariation by adapting 3 
the blicket detector paradigm for apes. We presented chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), 4 
bonobos (Pan paniscus), orangutans (Pongo abelii), gorillas (Gorilla gorilla), and children 5 
(Homo sapiens) with a novel reward dispenser, the blicket detector. The detector was 6 
activated by inserting specific (yet randomly determined) objects, the so-called blickets. Once 7 
activated a reward was released, accompanied by lights and a short tone. Participants were 8 
shown different patterns of variation and covariation between two different objects and the 9 
activation of the detector. When subsequently choosing between one of the two objects to 10 
activate the detector on their own all species, except gorillas (who failed the training), took 11 
these patterns of correlation into account. In particular, apes and 2.5-year-old children 12 
ignored objects whose effect on the detector completely depended on the presence of another 13 
object. Follow-up experiments explored whether the apes and children were also able to re-14 
evaluate evidence retrospectively. Only children (3-year-olds in particular) were able to make 15 
such retrospective inferences about causal structures from observing the effects of the 16 
experimenter’s actions. Apes succeeded here only when they observed the effects of their 17 
own interventions. Together, this study provides evidence that apes, like young children, 18 
accurately infer causal structures from patterns of (co)variation and that they use this 19 
information to inform their own interventions. 20 
Keywords: primate cognition, observational causal learning, problem-solving, blicket 21 
detector, comparative cognition 22 
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1 Introduction 1 
A chimpanzee looking up at the canopy suddenly sees a group of colobus monkeys 2 
moving in the tree and feels simultaneously a gust of wind followed by a fruit falling to the 3 
ground (cf. Tomasello & Call, 1997). Based on this observation, the chimpanzee might learn 4 
associations between the presence of monkeys, the gust of wind, and the appearance of the 5 
fruit. Detecting such spatio-temporal associations in the environment is an essential step to 6 
make causal inferences about the world. However, mere associations even while taking into 7 
account important principles such as temporal priority or spatial contiguity are not always 8 
sufficient to infer causal structures (Hume, 1748 / 2000). For instance, based on the above 9 
observation alone, it remains ambiguous what caused the fruit to fall down (Seed & Call, 10 
2009). One possibility is that the wind (W) and not the monkeys (M) caused the detachment 11 
of the fruit (F) (one-cause model: W  F). Alternatively, the gust of wind and the moving 12 
monkeys might be independent causes of a common effect (two-cause model: W  F  M). 13 
Given the evidence, other models such as common cause and causal chain models are viable 14 
alternatives too. 15 
Inferring causal structures in the environment based on the perceptual input is known as 16 
the causal inverse problem (Gopnik et al., 2004). Gopnik and colleagues proposed the 17 
differentiation of substantive and formal causal assumptions that might help an organism to 18 
solve this problem. On the one hand, substantive assumptions are specific causal principles 19 
such as the temporal order of cause and effect, spatial contiguity, and generally any prior 20 
knowledge about the world that constrains possible causal structures. On the other hand, 21 
formal assumptions provide a general, content-independent tool to infer causality-based 22 
patterns of correlation. These formal assumptions help us to distinguish between causal 23 
relations and mere correlations that are caused, for instance, by an unknown third factor (like 24 
an unobserved, common cause of two correlated variables).  25 
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Returning to the initial example, to resolve the aforementioned ambiguity between a 1 
one-cause model (W  F) and a two-cause model (W  F  M), there are two options 2 
based on these formal causal assumptions: interventions and passive observations taking into 3 
account conditional probabilities of the events (Gopnik et al., 2004). First of all, intervening 4 
on each of the potential causes (e.g. chasing the monkeys away) while keeping the presence 5 
or absence of the other candidate cause constant would lead to different expectations 6 
depending on different causal structures. The second option is to observe situations in which 7 
only one of two co-occurring events is present. For instance, observing whether the monkeys’ 8 
presence and the fruit’s appearance are correlated depending on the presence of wind will 9 
reveal whether there is a relation between monkeys and the fruit’s appearance independent of 10 
wind (as expected from a two-cause model but not from a one-cause model). The theoretical 11 
foundation for this is the causal Markov assumption (Hausman & Woodward, 1999) which 12 
states that given all direct causes of a variable are known and kept constant this variable will 13 
be independent of all other variables in the causal map except for its effects. 14 
To shed light on infants' ability to learn about novel causal structures, in particular with 15 
regard to their ability to discount alternative candidate causes, Gopnik and colleagues 16 
(Gopnik & Sobel, 2000; Gopnik, Sobel, Schulz, & Glymour, 2001; Nazzi & Gopnik, 2000) 17 
developed a new experimental paradigm. Gopnik et al. (2001) presented 2.5- to 4-year-old 18 
children with a new device, the so-called blicket detector. This detector lit up and played a 19 
tune, if certain objects, the blickets, were placed on top of it. Other objects did not activate 20 
the blicket detector. Children were told that that blickets would always make the machine go. 21 
The task for the children was to identify objects that were “like blickets”. The children 22 
received then different experimenter-given demonstrations. These demonstrations involved 23 
two novel objects but varied depending on the condition. In the one-cause condition, each 24 
object was placed on top of the detector by itself. One object (A) activated the detector; the 25 
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other one (B) did not. Then both objects were placed on top of the detector simultaneously 1 
two times in a row and both times the detector was activated. In the two-cause condition, 2 
each object was placed on top of the detector by itself three times in a row. Whereas one 3 
object (A) activated the detector three times in a row, the other object (B) did not activate the 4 
detector the first time but did so the two following times. Thus, in both conditions one object 5 
(A) was associated with the activation of the detector in 100% of instances, while the other 6 
object (B) only in 67% of cases. However, in the one-cause condition, the effect of object B 7 
was conditional on object A. In contrast, in the two-cause condition the effect of object B on 8 
the detector was not conditional on A. Therefore, in the one-cause condition only object A 9 
could be like a blicket, whereas in the two-cause condition both objects might be regarded as 10 
blickets. Children's performance confirmed the hypothesized difference between the two 11 
conditions. In the two-cause condition, 3- and 4-year-old children were more likely to say 12 
that object B (the 67% object) was a blicket than in the one-cause condition. Moreover, in a 13 
forced-choice situation, 2.5-year-olds preferred object A over B in the one-cause condition 14 
but not the two-cause condition. Hence, Gopnik and colleagues (2001) concluded that young 15 
children infer novel causal relations by using conditional dependencies to discounting 16 
alternative candidate causes.  17 
The extent to which the cognitive abilities of nonhuman great apes, our closest living 18 
relatives, might match those of humans is subject to ongoing debate. The relational 19 
reinterpretation hypothesis (Penn, Holyoak, & Povinelli, 2008) proposes that the cognitive 20 
differences between humans and nonhuman primates originate in the ability for abstract, 21 
relational reasoning. According to this view, nonhuman apes are incapable of re-interpreting 22 
perceptual input in terms of higher-order structural relations (e.g. reasoning about 23 
unobservable mechanisms and physical regularities). Contrary to this hypothesis, other 24 
scholars (Seed & Call, 2009) contended that nonhuman apes do have the capacity to encode 25 
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and process information at an abstract, structural level, and not only at the perceptual level 1 
(allowing, for instance, for transferring knowledge between perceptually disparate but 2 
functionally equivalent tasks). In line with the latter view, there is some experimental 3 
evidence suggesting that great apes, at least in some situations, take unobservable object 4 
properties (such as weight and solidity) into account when solving problems (for recent 5 
reviews see, Seed & Call, 2009; Seed, Hanus, & Call, 2011).  6 
Apart from this debate on nonhuman animals’ ability to reason about unobservable 7 
causal mechanisms, a central question in this context is how nonhuman animals (as compared 8 
to humans) learn and represent novel causal structures. Penn and Povinelli (2007, p. 110) 9 
propose that “nonhuman animals’ capacity for flexible goal-directed actions suggests that 10 
they explicitly represent the causal relation between their own action and its consequences”. 11 
At least in the case of their own instrumental actions, nonhuman apes may be able to 12 
distinguish between covariation and causation. However, up to this point no study has 13 
explicitly addressed this issue, not to mention the question of whether apes are also able to 14 
distinguish between causation and covariation solely based on observational evidence (e.g. by 15 
observing others’ interventions). 16 
Under natural conditions, animals often face situations with multiple covarying events 17 
as alluded to in our opening example. In order to make efficient predictions about their 18 
environment animals would benefit from differentiating between causation and covariation. 19 
Causal discounting, or explaining away, is important to achieve this differentiation. 20 
Discounting means that the presence of one cause of an effect reduces the requirement of 21 
invoking other causes (Sloman, 2009). In certain situations, cue competition effects known 22 
from the associative learning literature can lead to similar outcomes. The nature of the 23 
cognitive processes underlying these cue competition or interaction effects is the subject of 24 
an ongoing debate (De Houwer, Vandorpe, & Beckers, 2005). Evidence for the involvement 25 
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of inferential reasoning processes is provided by findings indicating that blocking effects are 1 
sensitive to ceiling effects and outcome additivity in rats and humans (Beckers, De Houwer, 2 
Pineno, & Miller, 2005; Beckers, Miller, De Houwer, & Urushihara, 2006). Additionally, the 3 
extent of training might be informative here. Cue competition effects in nonhuman animals 4 
are usually observed only after many exposures to the relevant contingencies (except for 5 
some specific contexts such as taste aversion). The demonstration of causal discounting after 6 
minimal exposure to the relevant contingencies (like in the blicket detector paradigm) would 7 
provide more evidence for the role of reasoning processes. 8 
Compared to the literature on causal mechanisms, very few studies have examined the 9 
capacity of nonhuman primates to learn novel causal structures. One such study investigated 10 
whether nonhuman great apes (henceforth apes) were sensitive to the temporal order of cause 11 
and effect in the context of an object displacement task (Völter & Call, 2014). In this study, 12 
great apes needed to locate a yoghurt reward that was hidden under one out of two opaque 13 
cups and displaced out of their sight. Crucially, the yogurt baited cup left a yoghurt trail 14 
behind it. The apes spontaneously used the trail to locate the baited cup. Moreover, when 15 
presented with two perceptually identical trails leading to two different cups the apes ignored 16 
the trail that was already present before the cups were displaced and picked the cup at the 17 
endpoint of the causally relevant trail. This suggests that apes can integrate temporal 18 
information about cause and effect when making causal judgments. 19 
The special role of causal interventions has been examined in nonprimate species. 20 
Blaisdell and colleagues (Blaisdell, Sawa, Leising, & Waldmann, 2006; Leising, Wong, 21 
Waldmann, & Blaisdell, 2008) provided evidence that rats (Rattus norvegicus) discriminate 22 
between the effects of their own interventions and observed effects. These studies suggest 23 
that when rats observe the effect of their own intervention they do not expect an alternative 24 
cause to be present. In contrast, when presented with the same effect that was not preceded by 25 
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their intervention rats seemed to expect that an alternative cause was present. Thus, rats seem 1 
to use their own interventions in order to discount alternative causes. This does not mean 2 
necessarily that they also deliberately perform such interventions to begin with in order to 3 
elucidate causal structures (Penn & Povinelli, 2007). 4 
Another study aiming at causal interventions compared New Caledonian crows (Corvus 5 
moneduloides), well-known for their habitual and flexible tool-use, with 2-year-old human 6 
children on a task in which subjects were required to insert an object into an apparatus 7 
(Taylor et al., 2014). The apparatus was made of transparent Plexiglas granting visual access 8 
to the bait and inner workings of the apparatus. If the object was inserted into the correct 9 
opening of the apparatus, a baited platform inside would revolve and dispense the reward. For 10 
crows observing the correlation between their own actions (i.e. “accidentally” inserting the 11 
pre-positioned object) and the appearance of the food reward was insufficient to produce the 12 
novel intervention. Only after a step-wise shaping procedure (involving on average more than 13 
100 trials), they were able to pick up the object and insert it into the apparatus. Two-year-old 14 
children, in contrast, quickly produced the novel intervention after having observed the 15 
“accidental” intervention on average 3.5 times. Other studies, in contrast, found that 16 
egocentric experience with task-relevant actions (i.e. inserting stones in a tube) or 17 
mechanisms (a collapsing platform) was sufficient for crows to pick up objects and insert 18 
them into a different apparatus (Bird & Emery, 2009; von Bayern, Heathcote, Rutz, & 19 
Kacelnik, 2009) Therefore, it remains contentious whether the deficits in performance 20 
reported by Taylor and colleagues (2014) are evidence for a general shortcoming in crows’ 21 
ability to produce causal interventions or related to difficulties imposed by this particular task 22 
(Jacobs, von Bayern, Martin-Ordas, Rat-Fischer, & Osvath, 2015). One interesting suggestion 23 
put forward to facilitate the task by Taylor and colleagues (2014) was to remove the 24 
information about the causal mechanism of the apparatus. This would potentially help the 25 
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birds to focus on the causal structure of the task (Jacobs et al., 2015). And it would 1 
effectively turn the apparatus into a blicket detector. 2 
The blicket detector paradigm may be well-suited to investigate causal discounting in 3 
great apes (and other habitual tool-users) because it can be conceptualized as a tool selection 4 
paradigm. Great apes, in particular chimpanzees and orangutans, are exceptional among 5 
nonhuman primates with regard to tool-use and innovation rates (Lefebvre, Reader, & Sol, 6 
2004). Tool selection studies have established that apes (as well as capuchin monkeys) take 7 
relevant properties of tools into account in order to select the most efficient tools. Their 8 
choice is flexible and dependent on the task they are facing (e.g., Manrique & Call, 2011; 9 
Manrique, Gross, & Call, 2010). The question arises how nonhuman apes initially acquire 10 
knowledge about relevant tools, tool properties, and actions and discount irrelevant ones.  11 
Sensitivity to the difference between confounded (i.e. multiple variables are altered at 12 
once) and unconfounded interventions (i.e. only one variable is altered at a time) is relevant 13 
here. Chimpanzees, for example, learn over an extended period of time to use tools from 14 
observing their mothers as primary model (e.g., Biro et al., 2003). Discerning between 15 
confounded and unconfounded interventions seems relevant for them in order to learn task 16 
relevant contingencies. In contrast to other tool selection studies, in the blicket detector 17 
paradigm the task-relevant tool properties are completely opaque and arbitrary and cannot be 18 
deduced from physical knowledge or prior experience. The exclusive source of information 19 
regarding the functionality of a given objects are demonstrations by a human model.  20 
In an attempt to adapt the blicket detector paradigm for nonhuman primates, Edwards 21 
and colleagues (2014) recently presented brown capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) with a 22 
version of the blicket detector that delivered food when certain objects were placed on top of 23 
the device. They used one set of items per condition (one-cause and two-condition) and 24 
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instead of demonstrations the monkeys could operate the detector on their own in the learning 1 
phase. The monkeys’ performance did not differ between the two conditions as they preferred 2 
object A (i.e. the 100% object) over object B (i.e. the 67% object) in both conditions. 3 
However, when they were allowed to choose between the “B” objects (i.e. 67% objects) of 4 
the one-cause and two-cause conditions, the monkeys preferred the object belonging to the 5 
two-cause condition. Several important changes to the original version of the blicket detector 6 
paradigm make these results hardly comparable to children’s performance, including the 7 
egocentric experience the monkeys got with the objects before the test phase (as compared to 8 
non-egocentric, experimenter-given demonstration in Gopnik and colleagues’ version of the 9 
blicket detector, see Gopnik et al., 2001), the amount of experience they got with each step of 10 
the demonstration (a whole session for the monkeys compared to one or two demonstrations 11 
for the children), and the number of different sets of objects (one set for the monkeys vs. two 12 
sets of objects per condition for the children). 13 
In the current study, we examined whether apes, like children, were able to identify the 14 
most likely cause by discounting alternatives when presented with patterns of variation and 15 
covariation. One of the main strengths of this study is its comparative dimension, more so for 16 
a task that has been argued to measure a fundamental component for human thought. It is 17 
important to ascertain whether this is unique to humans or a shared trait with our closest 18 
living relatives. Therefore, we adapted the original blicket detector paradigm for apes while 19 
maintaining its basic features including the type and amount of experience with the objects 20 
during the demonstration-phase and the number of trials per condition. A procedural 21 
adaptation of the task for apes was to use a forced-choice measure; like in Gopnik et al.’s 22 
study with 2.5-year-olds (2001, experiment 2). We sought to replicate the findings by Gopnik 23 
et al. with 2.5-year-olds and explored how 3-year-olds would perform with this forced-choice 24 
measure. Given similar performance of apes and 2.5-year-olds in different tasks aiming at 25 
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causal and physical cognition (Herrmann, Call, Hernández-Lloreda, Hare, & Tomasello, 1 
2007) we expected similar performance between apes and 2.5-year-olds. The major 2 
advantage of this set-up was that the causal relations involved in the task were novel and 3 
arbitrary and we were able to control the kind of evidence that subjects received. In addition, 4 
to be able to better compare, we examined to what extent the performance of preschool 5 
children depends on verbal scaffolding. 6 
2 Experiment 1 7 
2.1 Material and Methods 8 
2.1.1 Subjects. Twenty-one chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), eight bonobos (Pan 9 
paniscus), five orangutans (Pongo abelii), four gorillas (Gorilla gorilla), 25 2.5-year-old, and 10 
46 3-year-old human children participated in this experiment (see supplementary material for 11 
detailed information on the samples).  12 
2.1.2 Materials. The blicket detector consisted of a grey box (30 x 42 cm) with an 13 
L-shaped, transparent Plexiglas tube (diameter 7cm, 12 x 14 cm) attached on top that could 14 
be turned either away from the subjects or toward the subjects. Via this tube, objects could be 15 
inserted into the apparatus. Inserted objects fell down into a chamber inside the apparatus 16 
(see Figure 1). The subjects could see what was inside this chamber as the front side of the 17 
chamber was made out of transparent Plexiglas (16 x 16 cm). Underneath the chamber, there 18 
was a hole (diameter 6 cm) in the box where the food was delivered upon activation of the 19 
detector. There were three, white LEDs (diameter: 2.3 cm, 12 V), one integrated in the left 20 
side wall of the chamber, the other two were integrated in the front side of the apparatus. The 21 
only modification that we introduced for the children was a yellow cardboard cover that we 22 
glued to the front side of the apparatus and that covered the grey parts of the apparatus to 23 
make it more appealing for the children. 24 
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 1 
Figure 1. Illustration of the initial training phase, a) the experimenter inserts the white ball in 2 
the blicket detector via the tube on top of the apparatus, b) as soon as the ball touches the 3 
bottom of the chamber inside the apparatus three LEDs light up, the buzzer rings out, and the 4 
food appears simultaneously in the hole underneath the chamber, c) the experimenter turns 5 
the L-shaped tube on top of the apparatus towards the subject. 6 
Out of the subjects’ view, there was a hatch inside the apparatus on top of which the 7 
reward was placed. The hatch was controlled by an electromagnet (diameter 20mm, 15mm, 8 
60N, 12V). Moreover, there was a buzzer (75 dB, 400 Hz, 12V) inside the apparatus that 9 
served as acoustic signal. The experimenter (E) could control the detector via a foot pedal 10 
that was hidden behind a screen. When E pressed the pedal the detector switched on, i.e. the 11 
three LEDs illuminated, the buzzer rang out, and the hatch with the reward was released. The 12 
released food (a dry food pellet for the apes and colored, wooden beads for children) rolled 13 
down a ramp and stopped in front of the food hole where the subject could see and access it. 14 
We used 21 objects of different shapes, colors, and materials. No two objects were identical. 15 
The objects were divided into pairs based on their overall size. The same objects were used 16 
for apes and children. 17 
2.1.3 Procedure and Design. The general procedure was identical in every 18 
condition. For the apes, we fixed the blicket detector to the mesh of the test enclosure; for 19 
children we placed the blicket detector on a small table. Subjects had access to the food hole 20 
and the tube opening when the tube was turned toward the subject. Next to the blicket 21 
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detector, we presented the two objects on a table that we positioned perpendicularly to the 1 
detector. A Plexiglas panel with two small, circular holes (6cm) on opposite sides prevented 2 
subjects from grabbing the objects. In the beginning of each trial, E placed two objects 3 
(which were completely novel to the subjects) on top of the table facing the subject. Each 4 
object was shown individually to the subject and then placed in front of either the left or the 5 
right hole in the panel. Next the subjects received a demonstration that varied across 6 
conditions (see below). After this demonstration, E turned the tube on top of the detector 7 
toward the subject and pushed the two objects simultaneously towards the two holes in the 8 
panel. Subjects could choose one object by sticking their fingers through one of the two 9 
holes. Subjects received the chosen object and could then insert it inside the apparatus. If they 10 
did not do so within ten minutes, we stopped the session and repeated this trial in the next 11 
session (two subjects during the test phase, subjects did not alter their choice when the trial 12 
was repeated). If subjects gave the object back through the hole in the panel through which 13 
they had received it, they got to choose again (N=1). A trial was only scored as successful if 14 
subjects inserted the object in the apparatus which was the case in every trial except the ones 15 
mentioned above.  16 
2.1.3.1 Training phase. In the beginning of the first session, we familiarized subjects 17 
with the task. Therefore, we presented subjects with a white, wooden ball. E inserted the ball 18 
in the blicket detector that was switched on (see Figure 1). After the subject had retrieved the 19 
delivered reward, E placed the ball on the table, turned the tube on top of the detector toward 20 
the subject, re-baited the apparatus. After the subject had chosen the ball (the only available 21 
object), E gave the ball to the subject who could then insert it into the apparatus. After having 22 
passed this initial familiarization procedure (one trial), apes and children received in total 23 
four and two trials of discriminatory training, respectively (two trials per session). In every 24 
trial two novel objects were used. The location of the object on the platform was 25 
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counterbalanced within each subject. The demonstration was as follows: each object was 1 
inserted by itself, one after the other in counterbalanced order. One object (randomly 2 
determined and counterbalanced across subjects) activated the detector (object A); the other 3 
one (object B) did not (A+, B- or B-, A+). If subjects chose the correct item, E went on with 4 
the next set of objects. If the subject chose the incorrect object, E repeated the demonstration 5 
(with the same set of objects) and allowed the subject to choose again. If they again chose the 6 
incorrect object, E repeated this procedure one more time. The criterion for passing this 7 
training phase was choosing the correct object in three out of four trials (apes) / two of two 8 
trials (children) within a maximum of three attempts. 9 
2.1.3.2 Test phase. In the test phase, subjects received three different conditions of 10 
two trials each: baseline, one-cause, and two-cause condition (see Table 1). The baseline 11 
condition was identical to the training phase (A+, B- or B-, A+). However, subjects did not 12 
get the chance to correct themselves when they chose the incorrect object. 13 
Table 1 Overview on the different conditions administered in experiment 1 - 3 14 
Exp. Condition Demonstration 
Expected 
Preference for A 
1 
One-cause A+, B-, AB+, AB+ One-cause > Two-
cause Two-cause A+, A+, A+, B-, B+, B+ 
2/3 





Backward blocking CD+, CD+, C+ 
Note. The conditions are shown together with type of demonstration that subjects got before 15 
they could choose between objects A and B, and the relative preference for object A that we 16 
expected between the conditions. (+) represents activation, (-) no activation of the detector. 17 
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In the one-cause condition (see supplementary video 1), E presented subjects again with 1 
two new objects and inserted them by themselves one after the other (in counterbalanced 2 
order). One object (A) activated the detector; the other one did not (B). Then E inserted both 3 
objects together (AB) two times in a row and both times the detector was activated. Thus, the 4 
demonstration was as follows: A+, B-, AB+, AB+ (or B-, A+, AB+, AB+). Thereafter, the 5 
subjects were allowed to choose between object A (100% object) and B (67% object). 6 
In the two-cause condition, E presented subjects with two new objects. E inserted each 7 
object (A / B) by itself three times in a row. One object activated the detector all three times 8 
(object A), the other object did not activate the detector the first time but it did activate the 9 
detector the following two times (object B). The order of presentation was counterbalanced. 10 
Thus, the demonstration was as follows: A+, A+, A+, B-, B+, B+ (or B-, B+, B+, A+, A+, 11 
A+). Again, the subjects were then allowed to choose between object A (100% object) and B 12 
(67% object). 13 
Apes received two test sessions with one trial per condition. Children received one test 14 
session with two trials per condition. In each trial, apes and children faced a novel set of 15 
objects. The order of conditions was pseudo-randomized with the restriction that the baseline 16 
condition was never the first condition which we administered.  17 
Additionally, we examined the impact of verbal scaffolding on children’s performance. 18 
Therefore, we manipulated the type of verbal instruction given to 3-year-old children. One 19 
group received verbal scaffolding about the causal nature of the task following the procedure 20 
by Gopnik et al. (2001). E told the children that the machine was a "blicket machine" and that 21 
"blickets make the machine go." After the demonstration the experimenter presented the 22 
children with the choice between the two objects by saying: “Now it’s your turn. Which of 23 
the two objects is like the blicket?”. The other group of 3-year-olds as well as all 2.5-year-24 
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olds received no such verbal scaffolding: Children were introduced to the blicket detector by 1 
being told that the machine was a novel game. After the demonstration the E presented the 2 
children with the choice between the two objects by saying: “Now it’s your turn. Which of 3 
the two objects do you want to try?”. 4 
Differences in the procedure between apes and children (adjustments to the different 5 
testing environments) affected the number of training trials and the number of trials per 6 
session. In order to complete experiment 1 within one session, we only administered two 7 
training trials with children. Consequently, we also adjusted our criterion to the number of 8 
training trials.  9 
2.1.4 Scoring and analysis. We videotaped all sessions. We scored which object 10 
subjects inserted in the apparatus. A second coder scored 20% of all trials of the apes to 11 
assess interobserver reliability which was excellent (Κ=1, N=30, p<0.001). 12 
We used a Generalized Linear Mixed Model (GLMM; Baayen, 2008) with binomial 13 
error structure and logit link function to analyze the effects of condition and species on the 14 
percentage of trials object A was inserted in the blicket detector. We included condition, 15 
group, and the side of the 100% object as fixed effects, the interaction between condition and 16 
group, and subject as random effects. To keep type I error rate at the nominal level of 5% 17 
(Barr, Levy, Scheepers, & Tily, 2013; Schielzeth & Forstmeier, 2009) we included all 18 
possible random slopes components (condition and side of the 100% object within subject) 19 
and also the respective correlations between random slopes and intercepts. As an overall test 20 
of the effect of the predictor variables we compared the full model with a null model lacking 21 
the fixed effects condition and species but comprising the same control predictors and 22 
random effects structure as the full model (Forstmeier & Schielzeth, 2011) using a likelihood 23 
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ratio test (Dobson, 2002). P values for the individual effects were based on likelihood ratio 1 
tests comparing the full with respective reduced models (Barr et al., 2013; R function drop1).  2 
We assessed model stability by comparing the estimates derived by a model based on 3 
all data with those obtained from models with the levels of the random effects excluded one 4 
at a time. This revealed the model to be stable with regard to the effects of condition, species, 5 
side of the 100% object, and session. Overdispersion appeared to be no issue (dispersion 6 
parameter: 0.83).  7 
We used one-sample t-tests to test against the hypothetical chance level (p=0.5), 8 
binomial tests to test subjects’ first trial performance in session 1 against the chance level, 9 
and Fisher’s exact test to compare the first trial performance across conditions. All p-values 10 
reported here are exact and two-tailed (except for Fisher’s exact test). 11 
2.2 Results 12 
2.2.1 Training. Three out of eight bonobos (37.5%), seven out of 21 chimpanzees 13 
(33.3%), one out of five orangutans (20.0%), all four gorillas (100%), five of 25 2.5-year-olds 14 
(20%), and six of 46 3-year-olds (13%, four in the scaffolding condition and two in the 15 
demonstration-only condition) did not meet the training criterion as they either completely 16 
failed to insert the objects in the apparatus or failed to correct wrong choices. These subjects 17 
were excluded from all subsequent analyses. The remaining apes (N=23) scored significantly 18 
better than the expected chance value of 50% with regard to their first choice of the 100% 19 
object in the second training session (M±SE = 65.2 ± 6.6%; t(22)=2.30, p=0.031), but not in 20 
the first one (M±SE = 52.2 ± 6.7%; t(22)=0.33, p>0.250). Likewise, the remaining 2.5-year-21 
olds (M±SE = 67.5 ± 7.5%; N=20; t(19)=2.33, p=0.031) and 3-year-olds (M±SE = 87.5 ± 22 
3.5%; N=40; t(39)=10.82, P<0.001) scored significantly better than expected by chance in 23 
their training trials. 24 
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2.2.2 Test. We first analyzed whether there was a significant difference between the 1 
different species of nonhuman apes in our sample but neither the interaction between species 2 
and condition, or the main effect of species turned out to be significant (see supplementary 3 
material). Therefore, we collapsed the data of the different ape species in subsequent 4 
analyses. Moreover, we analyzed whether type of instruction influenced performance of the 5 
3-year-olds but we did not find a significant interaction between instruction and condition or 6 
a significant main effect of instruction (see supplementary material). Therefore, we collapsed 7 
the data of 3-year-olds who received different types of verbal instruction in subsequent 8 
analyses. 9 
Overall, the GLMM with group (apes, 2.5-year-olds, and 3-year-olds), condition (one-10 
cause, two-cause, and baseline), the interaction of group and condition, and the location of 11 
the 100% object (left or right) was significant compared to the null model (likelihood ratio 12 
test: χ²=28.10, df=8, p<0.001, see Figure 2). More specifically, we found a significant 13 
interaction between group and condition (χ²=17.25, df=4, p=0.002). Pairwise comparisons 14 
revealed that 3-year-olds performed significantly better in the two-cause condition compared 15 
to 2.5-year-olds (z=2.65, p=0.008) and apes (z=4.50, p<0.001). We found no significant 16 
difference between 2.5-year-olds and the apes in the two-cause condition (z=1.67, p=0.096). 17 
In contrast, we found no differences between the groups in the baseline condition (3-year-18 
olds vs. 2.5-year-olds: z=1.08, p>0.250; 3-year-olds vs. apes: z=0.18, p>0.250; 2.5-year-olds 19 
vs. apes: z=1.12, p>0.250) or the one-cause condition (3-year-olds vs. 2.5-year-olds: z=0.27, 20 
p>0.250; 3-year-olds vs. apes: z=0.22, p>0.250; 2.5-year-olds vs. apes: z=0.05, p>0.250). 21 
The location of the 100% object did not have a significant effect on performance (χ²=2.59, 22 
df=1, p=0.108). 23 
For apes the condition had a significant effect on performance (χ²=8.59, df=2, p=0.014) 24 
with apes choosing object A more frequently in the one-cause (z=2.61, p=0.009) and baseline 25 
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condition (z=2.39, p=0.017) compared to the two-cause condition. In contrast, apes showed 1 
no difference between the one-cause and baseline condition (z=0.27, p>0.250). For 2.5-year-2 
olds (χ²=5.49, df=2, p=0.064) or 3-year-olds (χ²=4.93, df=2, p=0.085) there was no 3 
significant effect of condition on their performance. 4 
In the one-cause condition apes (t(22)=2.31, p=0.030) and 3-year-olds (t(39)=2.76, 5 
p=0.009) but not 2.5-year-olds (t(19)=1.561, p=0.135) chose the 100% objects significantly 6 
more often than expected by chance. In contrast, in the two-cause condition apes tended to 7 
prefer the 67% object (t(22)=2.02, p=0.056). Whereas 2.5-year-olds (t(19)=0.81, p>0.250) 8 
did not show a preference for the 100% in the two-cause condition either, 3-year-olds 9 
(t(39)=7.26, p<0.001) chose the 100% object significantly more often than expected by 10 
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 1 
Figure 2. Exp. 1: a) Proportion (and number) of subjects who chose object A in their 2 
first trial across conditions; b) Proportion of trials in which object A (the 100% object) was 3 
selected across the different test conditions (mean ± SE). For each condition, we administered 4 
two trials per subject. In each trial, we presented subjects with a novel set of objects. 5 
Demonstration: baseline A+, B-; one-cause A+, B-, AB+, AB+; two-cause A+, A+, A+, B-, 6 
B+, B+. 7 
To exclude carry-over effects across trials or sessions, we also analyzed whether the 8 
participants performed differently between the first and second trial of each condition. We 9 
found a significant interaction between trial number and condition for 2.5-year-olds (χ²=6.54, 10 
df=2, p=0.038) but not for apes (χ²=4.01, df=2, p=0.134) or 3-year-olds (χ²=1.69, df=2, 11 
p=0.430; see Fig. 2a). Condition had a significant effect on 2.5-year-olds’ performance in the 12 
first (χ²=11.22, df=2, p=0.004) but not the second trial (χ²=3.15, df=2, p=0.207). In their first 13 
trial, 2.5-year-olds performed significantly better in the one-cause and baseline condition 14 
(z=3.23, p=0.001) compared to the two-cause condition (z=2.74, p=0.006). We found no 15 
difference between the one-cause and baseline condition (z=0.11, p=0.914). Moreover, we 16 
analyzed separately the first trial of the first session. Apes (10 of 11 chose object A, 90.9%, 17 

































CAUSAL LEARNING IN GREAT APES AND CHILDREN 21 
 
p=0.065), and 3-year-olds (18 of 21 chose object A, 85.7%, binomial test: P=0.002) showed a 1 
preference for the 100% object in the first trial of the one-cause condition. In the two-cause 2 
condition apes (6 of 12 chose object A, 50.0%) and 2.5-year-olds (1 of 9 chose object A, 3 
11.1%, binomial test: p=0.039) did not exhibit a preference for the 100% object. In contrast, 4 
3-year-olds also showed a significant preference for the 100% object in the two-cause 5 
condition (18 of 19 children chose object A, 94.7%, binomial test: p<0.001). In line with our 6 
hypothesis, apes (Fisher’s exact test: p=0.045, one-tailed) and 2.5-year-olds (p=0.003, one-7 
tailed) decided significantly more often for the 100% object in the one-cause compared to the 8 
two-cause condition. First trial performance of three-year-olds, in contrast, was not affected 9 
by condition (p>0.250). 10 
2.3 Discussion 11 
First, our findings demonstrate extremely fast discriminatory learning in apes and 12 
young children. After only a single demonstration with each object, apes and children were 13 
able to discriminate between two novel objects (apes in their second training session and 14 
children in their first session). Second, we found that the apes and 2.5-year olds discriminated 15 
between the one-cause and two-cause conditions. In line with our hypothesis, apes selected 16 
the 100% object (A) more often in the one-cause condition than in the two-cause condition 17 
and more often than expected by chance. Notably, this was already the case in the very first 18 
trial of session 1, thus, ruling out potential learning effects across trials or sessions. A similar 19 
pattern emerged for 2.5-year-old children in their very first trial: 2.5-year-olds, like the apes, 20 
preferred the 100% object over the 67% object in their first trial in the one-cause condition 21 
but not in the two-cause condition. Overall, the results for 2.5-year-olds did not differ 22 
significantly from the performance of the apes. Three-year-olds, in contrast, chose the objects 23 
that were consistently associated with the effect in all conditions, irrespective of the 24 
instruction they received, and they did so from the very first trial onwards. In contrast to apes 25 
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and 2.5-year-olds, 3-year-olds preferred the 100% object also in the two-cause condition and 1 
they performed significantly better than apes and 2.5-year-olds in this condition. 2 
Thus, apes and 2.5-year-olds preferred objects associated with the effect but only if 3 
they were not screened off by another object. These findings suggest that apes and 2.5-year-4 
olds use conditional dependencies when making causal inferences in a completely novel and 5 
arbitrary context. Importantly, unlike a previous study with capuchin monkeys (Edwards, 6 
Rottman, & Santos, 2011; Edwards et al., 2014), the experience that the subjects got before 7 
they chose between the two objects was not egocentric, i.e. they were not allowed to try the 8 
objects out by themselves but had to observe an experimenter-given demonstration. Based on 9 
this observational information, apes and children produced their own interventions on the 10 
task.  11 
We did not find any significant species differences among nonhuman apes. However, 12 
given the small sample size per species this negative result is unsurprising. We note that 13 
gorillas failed the training altogether. Three out of four gorillas did not even try to insert the 14 
initial object into the apparatus within four sessions after having observed a demonstration. A 15 
greater level of neophobia relative to other ape species might have contributed to their failure, 16 
especially given that we did not habituate subjects to the objects before the test. 17 
Could procedural differences between children and apes, in particular, with regard to 18 
the number of training trials and trials per session, account for the present findings? We think 19 
this is unlikely for two reasons. First, apes and 2.5-year-olds performed at comparable levels 20 
in their final two training trials before entering the test phase. Second, the first trial analysis 21 
showed a similar pattern for apes and 2.5-year-olds (see Figure 2a). A similar training 22 
outcome might be the best way to ensure a valid comparison between children and apes given 23 
their different experience with human artifacts. 24 
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In contrast to the original study by Gopnik and colleagues (2001, Experiment 1), we 1 
presented 3-year-olds here with a forced-choice test. Three-year-olds in Gopnik et al. study 2 
performed at ceiling when asked whether object A was like a blicket. Therefore, it is not 3 
surprising that three-year-olds in the current study preferred the most effective object in both 4 
the one-cause and two-cause condition. This finding is also in line with results by Kushnir 5 
and Gopnik (2005) showing that 4-year-olds prefer objects (in a forced-choice setting) that 6 
are more effective in activating the blicket detector by itself. More specifically, they prefer 7 
objects that are associated with the effect in 3/3 vs 1/3 instances or 2/3 vs 1/3 instances. Our 8 
study serves to extend these findings to 3-year-olds who preferred more effective objects 9 
(3/3) over less effective objects (2/3). 10 
In the current study, the 2.5-year-olds performed better in the one-cause condition 11 
compared to the two-cause condition but only in their first trial in each condition. These 12 
differences might be due to changes in the experimental procedure compared to the original 13 
study. First, in the original study blickets were not only associated with the onset of the 14 
detector but removal of the blickets was also associated with the termination of the effect. In 15 
the current study, the insertion of blickets activated the detector; however, the effect ended by 16 
itself after a fixed period of time. Therefore, only the onset of the effect but not its 17 
termination was contingent upon the blicket which might have resulted in a less salient 18 
relation between blicket and detector. Moreover, in the current setup the activation of the 19 
detector included dispensing a reward, which might have distracted them from the relevant 20 
contingencies or changed their motivation to maximize the number of rewards by “playing it 21 
safe” (i.e. choosing the 100% throughout the different conditions).  22 
Despite these differences in design, we found evidence that in a forced-choice 23 
procedure apes, like 2.5-year-olds, used patterns of variation and covariation to infer 24 
accurately novel causal structures. Three-year-olds, in contrast, performed rationally by 25 
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choosing the most effective objects throughout the different conditions. Next, we investigated 1 
whether apes and children would also be sensitive to a more complex type of conditional 2 
independence involving retrospective re-evaluation of the evidence. 3 
3 Experiment 2 4 
3.1 Material and Methods 5 
3.1.1 Subjects. Sixteen chimpanzees, six bonobos, four orangutans, 15 2.5-year 6 
olds, and 36 3-year-olds participated in this experiment. All subjects had participated in 7 
Experiment 1 before. The interval between the experiment 1 and 2 was on average 43 days 8 
(range: 30-50 days) for the apes, 2 days (1-4 days) for 2.5-year-olds, and 3 days (1-13 days) 9 
for 3-year-olds. 10 
3.1.2 Materials. The apparatus was the same as in Experiment 1. Twelve novel 11 
objects were used as stimuli.  12 
3.1.3 Procedure and Design. The basic procedure including the randomization was 13 
identical to Experiment 1. Subjects that passed the training phase in Experiment 1 did not get 14 
any more training trials in the current experiment. Apes that failed the training in Experiment 15 
1 got another two sessions of training as in Experiment 1 but with novel objects. The same 16 
criterion for entering the test phase was used as in Experiment 1 17 
In the test phase, subjects received three different conditions with two trials each: 18 
baseline, backward blocking, and retrospective discounting condition (see Table 1). The 19 
baseline condition was identical to Experiment 1 (C+, D- or D-, C+). In the backward 20 
blocking and retrospective discounting condition, E presented subjects with two novel objects 21 
and inserted them together (CD) and the detector was activated. This step was repeated once. 22 
In the backward blocking, E inserted object C into the apparatus by itself once, thereby, 23 
CAUSAL LEARNING IN GREAT APES AND CHILDREN 25 
 
activating the detector (CD+, CD+, C+). In the retrospective discounting condition, E inserted 1 
object D into the apparatus by itself once but the detector did not activate (CD+, CD+, D-). 2 
Then the subjects were allowed to choose between object C and D. 3 
Thus, in the retrospective discounting condition the associated effect of C on the 4 
detector was conditional on D whereas in the backward blocking condition the effect of C 5 
was independent of D. In contrast to Experiment 1, subjects had to re-evaluate the conditional 6 
probabilities after the initial, joint CD demonstrations.  7 
3.1.4 Scoring and analysis. Same as in Experiment 1. Overdispersion was not an 8 
issue (dispersion parameter: 0.76). 9 
3.2 Results 10 
Figure 3 presents the performance of apes, 2.5-year-olds, and 3-year-olds across 11 
condition. A GLMM with group, condition, the interaction of group and condition, and the 12 
location of the 100% object was significant compared to the null model (likelihood ratio test: 13 
χ²=24.28, df=8, p=0.002). More specifically, we found a significant interaction between 14 
group and condition (likelihood ratio test: χ²=10.02, df=4, p=0.040). Pairwise comparisons 15 
revealed that 3-year-olds performed significantly better than apes in the retrospective 16 
discounting condition (z=2.11, p=0.035) and the baseline condition (z=2.23, p=0.026). 17 
Between 3-year-olds and 2.5-year-olds we found no difference in retrospective discounting 18 
(z=0.19, p>0.250) or baseline (z=1.11, p>0.250). Similarly, 2.5-year-olds and the apes did 19 
not differ from each other in retrospective discounting (z=1.51, p=0.132) or baseline (z=0.87, 20 
P>0.250). There were no significant differences between groups in the backward blocking 21 
condition (3-year-olds vs. 2.5-year-olds: z=0.55, p>0.250; 3-year-olds vs. apes: z=1.12, 22 
p>0.250; 2.5-year-olds vs. apes: z=1.38, p=0.167).  23 




Figure 3. Exp. 2: a) Proportion (and number) of subjects who chose object C in their first trial 3 
across conditions; b) Proportion of trials in which object C was selected across the different 4 
test conditions (mean ± SE). For each condition, there were two trials per subject. In each 5 
trial subjects were presented with a different set of objects. Demonstration: baseline C+, D-; 6 
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For 3-year-olds, the condition had a significant effect on performance (χ²=15.56, df=2, 1 
p<0.001) with 3-year-olds performing better in the retrospective discounting (z=2.01, 2 
p=0.036) and baseline condition (z=3.57, p<0.001) compared to the backward blocking 3 
condition. We found no difference between the retrospective discounting condition and the 4 
baseline condition (z=1.03, p>0.250). For 2.5-year-olds (χ²=5.08, df=2, p=0.079) and the apes 5 
(χ²=1.92, df=2, p>0.250) we found no significant effect of condition. The location of the 6 
100% object did not have a significant effect on performance (χ²=2.87, df=1, p=0.090). 7 
One-sample t-tests against the hypothetical chance value of 50%, provided no evidence 8 
that subjects’ choices deviated significantly from chance in the backward blocking condition 9 
(apes: t(25)=1.28, p=0.212; 2.5-year-olds: t(14)=0.69, p>0.250; 3-year-olds: t(35)=0.30, 10 
p>0.250). In the retrospective discounting condition, 3-year-olds (t(35)=2.58, p=0.014) but 11 
not apes (t(25)=0.57, p>0.250) or 2.5-year-olds (t(14)=1.74, p=0.104) choose the 100% 12 
object significantly more often than expected by chance.  13 
Again, we analyzed whether participants’ performance was affected by the trial number 14 
within each condition. We found no interaction between trial number and condition for 2.5-15 
year-olds (χ²=3,92, df=2, p=0.141), 3-year-olds (χ²=0.68, df=2, p=0.711), or apes (χ²=3.00, 16 
df=2, p=0.224). First trial analysis in session 1 did not reveal significant preferences for 17 
object C for apes (backward blocking: 10 of 14 apes, 71.4%, binomial test: p=0.180; 18 
retrospective discounting: 8 of 12 apes, 66.7%, p>0.250), 2.5-year-olds (backward blocking: 19 
4 of 8 children, 50%; retrospective discounting: 5 of 7 apes, 71.4%, p>0.250), or 3-year-olds 20 
(backward blocking: 8 of 21 children, 38.1%, binomial test: p>0.250; retrospective 21 
discounting: 9 of 15 children, 60%, p>0.250). 22 
3.3 Discussion 23 
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Three-year-olds, in contrast to the apes, were able to discriminate retrospectively 1 
between the two objects based on the retrospective discounting demonstration. The 2 
performance of 2.5-year-olds resembled the performance of 3-year-olds even though they did 3 
not perform significantly better than expected by chance in the retrospective discounting 4 
condition. However, this negative result might be attributed to the small sample size of 2.5-5 
year-olds. In the backward blocking condition, in contrast, neither children nor apes 6 
discriminated between the two objects. 7 
Children’s performance in the current study is in line with previous research using the 8 
blicket detector paradigm. Following backward blocking demonstrations (CD+, CD+, C+), 9 
Sobel and colleagues (Sobel & Kirkham, 2006; Sobel, Tenenbaum, & Gopnik, 2004) found 10 
that 2- and 3-year-old children, unlike 4-year-olds, did not show a significant preference for 11 
object A. In contrast, they showed such a preference in retrospective discounting (CD+, CD+, 12 
D-; which they term ‘indirect screening-off’ condition). Consistent with these findings, 13 
Beckers and colleagues (2009) found evidence for retrospective discounting but not for 14 
backward blocking in 3-year-olds using a forced-choice procedure like in the current study. 15 
McCormack and colleagues (2009) reliably found such retrospective cue competition effects 16 
only at the age of 5-6 years. The large variation in the developmental onset of these cue 17 
competition effects across studies within the same experimental paradigm has been explained 18 
by the involvement of controlled reasoning processes (McCormack et al., 2009). Using 19 
different methods such as anticipatory looking paradigms, cue competition effects were found 20 
in much younger infants (Sobel & Kirkham, 2006).  21 
What made this task harder for the apes and 2.5-year-olds compared to Experiment 1? 22 
The difference compared to Experiment 1 was twofold. First, the current task required 23 
retrospective re-evaluation of the evidence whereas in Experiment 1 the apes could 24 
discriminate between the two objects based on the first information that they got in the one-25 
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cause condition. Second, in experiment 2 we showed the apes whether object C by itself was 1 
activating the detector or not. However, in contrast to Experiment 1, we did not show them 2 
whether or not object D would activate the detector by itself. Thus, the evidence that the apes 3 
received in Experiment 2 was incomplete. Third, apes might have not paid sufficient attention 4 
to the experimenter-given demonstrations. To examine whether apes are in fact unable to 5 
succeed on such retrospective re-evaluation tasks given sparse evidence we presented them 6 
again with these conditions. This time, however, we manipulated whether apes could insert 7 
the objects on their own (and observe the effects of their own interventions on the apparatus) 8 
or whether they would receive as before demonstrations by a human experimenter. 9 
 10 
4 Experiment 3 11 
4.1 Material and Methods 12 
4.1.1 Subjects. Twenty-two chimpanzees, eight bonobos, and seven orangutans 13 
participated in this experiment. All subjects except for two juvenile orangutans and three 14 
chimpanzees had participated in Experiment 1 and/or 2 before. The interval between the 15 
experiment 2 and 3 was on average 157 days (range: 134-169 days). 16 
4.1.2 Materials. The apparatus was the same as in Experiment 1. Sixteen novel 17 
objects were used as stimuli.  18 
4.1.3 Procedure and Design. Subjects who did not participate in the test phase of 19 
experiment 1 or 2 received an initial training with a single object that activated the apparatus 20 
when being inserted by E (see experiment 1). Eight subjects received the initial training. Two 21 
of these eight individuals (two juvenile orangutans) started to insert the objects on their own 22 
after having received the demonstration and continued with the discrimination training. The 23 
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six remaining subjects did not insert the objects within four sessions and were excluded from 1 
the study. 2 
We administered two test phases: an observation and an intervention phase. We 3 
counterbalanced the order of the phases across subjects. The observation phase was identical 4 
to the previous experiments, i.e. the subjects received experimenter-given demonstrations 5 
before they could choose and insert one of the two objects. E inserted the objects by placing 6 
them directly inside the detector via the backside of the apparatus. In the intervention phase, 7 
the apes could insert the objects during the demonstration on their own. Here, E handed the 8 
objects to the apes according to the demonstration scheme via the central hole in the panel to 9 
which the sliding platform was mounted. For compound demonstrations (CD+), we tied the 10 
two objects by means of zip ties. Thereby, we ensured that the apes would insert the two 11 
objects together in CD+ demonstrations of the intervention condition. After the compound 12 
trials, E cut the zip tie in full view of the subject and split the two objects. On a few 13 
occasions, apes broke the zip tie. In these trials, we prevented the apes from inserting the 14 
separated objects into the apparatus (by blocking access to the tube on top of the detector) 15 
and asked the objects back in order to re-tie them. We excluded one orangutan and one 16 
chimpanzee from the intervention condition because they managed to insert a single object 17 
during a compound trial after they had broken the zip tie.  18 
In contrast to previous experiments, not only the activation of the detector was 19 
contingent upon the insertion of certain objects (as before) but also the deactivation of the 20 
detector was correlated with the removal of the object from the apparatus. We included this 21 
modification to increase the salience of the effect. 22 
In each phase, subjects received one training session and two test sessions. The training 23 
consisted of C+, C+, D- , D- demonstrations (in counterbalanced order). Depending on the 24 
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phase, subjects passively observed experimenter-given demonstrations or could intervene on 1 
the apparatus by inserting the objects on their own. Subjects proceeded to the test phase of 2 
each condition only if they met the training criterion (same as in the previous experiments: 3 
correct choice in every trial at least in their second attempt). 4 
In the test trials of each phase, subjects received the backward blocking (CD+, CD+, C+) 5 
and retrospective discounting condition (CD+, CD+, D-). We administered one trial per 6 
condition. Subjects received one trial per session. We counterbalanced the order of conditions 7 
across subjects. 8 
4.1.4 Scoring and analysis. We used McNemar's test to compare the conditions in 9 
each test phase. For the combined analysis of both test phases we used a GLMM. We 10 
included condition, test phase, order of test phases, and side of the 100% object in the model 11 
as well as subject ID as random effect. We also included random slopes of the side of the 12 
100% object within subject. Overdispersion was not an issue (dispersion parameter: 1.14).  13 
 14 
4.2 Results 15 
4.2.1 Training. Twenty-nine individuals inserted the objects during the training 16 
phase of the observation and intervention condition (one chimpanzee inserted the objects only 17 
in the intervention training and one juvenile orangutan inserted the objects only in the 18 
observation training). In both training phases, subjects choose the 100% object significantly 19 
more often than expected by chance (intervention: M±SEM 79.3±5.9%, t(28)=5.03, p<0.001; 20 
observation: 65.5±5.4%, t(28)=2.77, p=0.010). In the intervention phase, 21 out of 29 21 
individuals met the training criterion (six bonobos, 11 chimpanzees, and four orangutans). In 22 
the observation phase, 18 out of 29 individuals reached the criterion (three bonobos, 12 23 
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chimpanzees, and three orangutans). Thirteen individuals (three bonobos, eight chimpanzees, 1 
and two orangutans) passed both trainings. 2 
4.2.2 Test. Figure 4 presents the performance of apes across conditions and test 3 
phases.  4 
4.2.2.1 Observation phase. As in experiment 2, we found no significant difference 5 
between conditions (exact McNemar's test: p=0.688) and subjects did not score significantly 6 
better than expected by chance in any condition (backward blocking: M±SEM 55.6±12.1%, 7 
p=0.815, retrospective discounting: 66.7±11.4%, p=0.238). 8 
 9 
 Figure 4. Exp. 3: Proportion of subjects that chose object C across the different test 10 
conditions and test phases (mean ± SE). For each condition, there was one trial per subject. 11 
4.2.2.2 Intervention phase. Likewise, we found no significant difference between 12 
conditions (exact McNemar's test: p=0.344) when the apes operated the apparatus on their 13 
own during the demonstration. However, subjects scored significantly better than expected by 14 
chance in the retrospective discounting condition (M±SEM 81.0±8.8%, p=0.007) but not in 15 
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4.2.2.3 Comparison between observation and intervention phase. When analyzing 1 
the data of the thirteen individuals who completed both test phases, the GLMM did not reveal 2 
a significant interaction between observation/intervention and backward 3 
blocking/retrospective discounting conditions (χ²=0.46, df=1, p=0.499). After removing the 4 
interaction from the model, we found that the apes performed significantly better in the 5 
retrospective discounting condition compared to the backward blocking condition (χ²=4.27, 6 
df=1, p=0.039). No significant difference was found between the observation and 7 
intervention phase (χ²=0.13, df=1, p=0.713), the order of the phases (χ²=0.19, df=1, p=0.666), 8 
or the location of the 100% object (χ²=0.85, df=1, p=0.357). 9 
4.3 Discussion 10 
In the current experiment, the apes performed overall significantly better when they 11 
received negative information (D-) as compared to positive evidence (C+) about the 12 
contingency between one object and the activation of the apparatus. Apes performed 13 
particularly well in the retrospective discounting condition of the intervention phase, i.e. 14 
when the apes by themselves could intervene on the apparatus. Apes’ modest performance in 15 
the observation phase replicates the findings obtained in experiment 2: based on 16 
observational evidence alone, the apes did not perform above chance in any retrospective re-17 
evaluation condition. Operating at the apparatus by themselves seemed to facilitate the task 18 
even though we did not find a significant difference between the observation and intervention 19 
phases. Apes’ performance in the current experiment resembles the performance of three-20 
year-old children in experiment 2. That is, apes, like three-year-olds, performed overall 21 
significantly better in the retrospective discounting condition compared to the backward 22 
blocking condition.  23 
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The forced-choice procedure employed in the current set of experiments has the 1 
notorious problem that the performance may be explained based on the avoidance of one 2 
alternative, a preference for the other alternative, or a combination of the two. For the current 3 
results this means that apes in the retrospective discounting condition might have merely 4 
avoided object D (and chose the only remaining object on the platform, object C) or that they 5 
have inferred (by excluding object D as candidate cause) that object C is the most likely 6 
cause of the detector onset. The results obtained in the two-cause condition of experiment 1 7 
suggest, however, that a single extinction trial (D-) alone might not necessarily be sufficient 8 
to bias apes’ choices. Only in combination with compound trials (CD+), single extinction 9 
trials had a significant effect on apes’ performance (one-cause condition in experiment 1 and 10 
retrospective discounting condition in experiment 3) – a finding which is in line with an 11 
inference by exclusion account. In an inferential framework, the CD+ demonstration suggests 12 
that at least one of the two objects is causing the effect. Without this basis, the D- 13 
demonstration does not allow for making any valid inferences about the causal status of 14 
object C. 15 
If avoidance alone does not alone explain apes’ performance, cue competition effects 16 
such as backward blocking and recovery from overshadowing might be at work here. The 17 
current findings suggest that apes’ performance can be accounted for by recovery from 18 
overshadowing but not by backward blocking. From an associative learning perspective, 19 
however, both of these cue competition effects are expected under the same circumstances 20 
(Beckers et al., 2009). Again, from an inferential point of view, these results are expected 21 
because CD+ followed by C+ demonstrations are not informative about the causal status of 22 
object D. CD+ followed by D- trials, in contrast, do provide evidence for the causal 23 
relationship between object C and the effect.  24 
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Notwithstanding the above, methods are desirable that allow by design for 1 
disentangling avoidance and active choice explanations. In a follow-up experiment, we 2 
presented apes with more complex patterns of demonstration (cf. Beckers et al., 2009) that 3 
make differential predictions for the two types of explanation. These demonstrations were 4 
based on their own interventions and involved four (instead of two) objects presented as two 5 
compound stimuli on the platform. However, the apes failed already during the 6 
discrimination suggesting that tracking the increased number of stimuli concurrently located 7 
on the platform hampered their performance (see supplementary material). 8 
In our final experiment, we investigated another feature that is often used to 9 
differentiate causal from spurious relations, the spatial relationship between cause and effect. 10 
Following Gopnik and Sobel (2000), we examined apes’ sensitivity to the spatial relationship 11 
between the objects and the apparatus during the demonstration.  12 
 13 
5 Experiment 4 14 
5.1 Methods 15 
5.1.1 Subjects. Thirteen chimpanzees, eight bonobos, and five orangutans 16 
participated in this experiment. All subjects had participated in Experiment 3 before. The 17 
interval between the experiment 3 and 4 was on average 77 days (range: 76-85 days). 18 
5.1.2 Materials. The apparatus was the same as in Experiment 1. Sixteen novel 19 
objects were used as stimuli.  20 
5.1.3 Procedure and Design. We administered two conditions, the causal and 21 
association condition. In both conditions, subjects received experimenter-given A+, A+, B-, 22 
B- demonstrations (in counterbalanced order, each trial with a novel set of objects). The 23 
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causal condition was identical to the previous experiments, i.e. E inserted the objects in the 1 
apparatus. In the association condition, the procedure was identical with the exception that E 2 
did not insert the objects into the apparatus but held them up next to the apparatus while the 3 
apes were sitting at the apparatus and looking towards E. E held the objects up directly at the 4 
Plexiglas panel separating E and the apes. For A+ demonstrations, E would then insert her 5 
hand into the apparatus and touch the bottom of the chamber (while holding up object A with 6 
her other hand). In B- demonstrations E lifted her hand behind the apparatus without inserting 7 
it in the apparatus while holding up object B with her other hand. In both conditions, the 8 
demonstration lasted for 3 seconds (E controlled the timing by means of a metronome). After 9 
these demonstrations, apes were allowed to choose one of the two objects. If they picked 10 
object B, the apparatus would not be activated upon insertion of the object and the trial was 11 
repeated once. 12 
5.1.4 Scoring and analysis. Same as in Experiment 1. We included condition, order 13 
of conditions, session, side of the 100% object, and species in the model as well as subject ID 14 
as random effect. We also included random slopes of condition, order of condition, session, 15 
and side of the 100% object within subject. Overdispersion appeared to be no issue 16 
(dispersion parameter: 0.84). 17 
5.2 Results 18 
We found that the order of conditions had a marginally significant effect on apes’ 19 
performance (see Figure 5). Apes tended to perform better in their second condition 20 
compared to the first one (χ²=3.77, df=1, p=0.052). In the association condition, apes 21 
performed significantly better when they received the association condition after the causal 22 
condition as compared to when they received the association condition first (χ²=3.86, df=1, 23 
p=0.049). In the causal condition the order did not have a significant effect on performance 24 
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(χ²=1.19, df=1, p=0.274). Apart from this order effect, the GLMM did not reveal any other 1 
significant effect (condition: χ²=1.35, df=1, p=0.245; species: χ²=1.40, df=2, p=0.496; 2 
session: χ²=2.54, df=1, p=0.111; side of the 100% object: χ²=0.06, df=1, p=0.811). 3 
 4 
Figure 5. Exp. 4: Proportion of trials in which object A was selected across the different test 5 
conditions and order of administration (mean ± SE). For each condition, there were four trials 6 
per subject. 7 
Apes selected the 100% object significantly above chance levels in the causal condition 8 
(t(25)=4.50, p<0.001) but not in the association condition (t(25)=1.69, p=0.103). Irrespective 9 
of the order in which the conditions were administered, apes performed significantly above 10 
chance in the causal condition (1st: t(11)=2.57, p=0.026; 2nd: t(13)=3.68, p=0.003) but their 11 
performance did not deviate significantly from chance in the association condition (1st: 12 
t(13)=0.62, p=0.547; 2nd: t(11)=1.73, p=0.111).  13 
After errors had occurred (i.e. when apes chose object B), we repeated the trial and let 14 
them choose again. In the association condition, apes tended to repeat the error. They showed 15 
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before) in their second attempt (t(22)=-2.23, p=0.036). In the causal condition, apes’ second 1 
choice did not deviate significantly from the hypothetical chance level of 50% (t(22)=-0.49, 2 
p=0.628).  3 
5.3 Discussion 4 
The apes chose the 100% object significantly above chance levels only when the object 5 
made contact with the apparatus (causal condition) but not when the object was only held up 6 
by the experimenter next to the apparatus (association condition). Moreover, in the 7 
association condition apes were less flexible when they made errors and tended to repeat 8 
incorrect choices - something that was not the case in the causal condition. We note that the 9 
effects found in this experiment were rather weak and partially driven by an order effect 10 
(apes performed better in the association condition after having received the causal condition 11 
before). Nevertheless, the results suggest that apes’ performance in the causal condition was 12 
more robust than in the association condition. 13 
The causal and association condition shared some important procedural features: in 14 
both conditions, the experimenter was lifting up one of two objects, which was followed (or 15 
not) by the onset of the apparatus. In the causal condition this effect was produced upon the 16 
insertion of the object whereas in the association condition the hand of the experimenter was 17 
inserted in the apparatus while the object was held up next to the apparatus. Apes’ above-18 
chance performance in the causal condition suggests that the insertion of the object into the 19 
apparatus facilitated the task for them.  20 
It is conceivable that the apes have learned in the course of the previous experiments to 21 
pay attention in particular to what happened inside the apparatus. We made sure that apes 22 
would look at the objects during the demonstration in both conditions and that the time the 23 
apes would encounter the contingency between objects and the state of the apparatus would 24 
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be identical. Nevertheless, the apes might have directed their attention more to what 1 
happened inside the apparatus than what happened next to it. Whether or not physical contact 2 
between object and apparatus was crucial for apes’ choices in this task can therefore not 3 
conclusively determined here. At the very least, our results suggest that apes learned to pay 4 
attention to the spatial relationship between the objects and the apparatus and not merely to 5 
the actions of the experimenter (e.g. lifting one of the objects) and its contingency with the 6 
food reward. 7 
 8 
6 General discussion 9 
Our findings suggest that apes, like young children, take patterns of variation and 10 
covariation into account to infer novel causal structures under some circumstances. Based on 11 
this information they produce their own interventions to bring about the desired effect. More 12 
specifically, apes and 2.5-year-olds demonstrated sensitivity to conditional independence in a 13 
completely novel and arbitrary context (experiment 1). Importantly, their choices were based 14 
on the minimal number of observations required for this kind of cue competition effects. That 15 
is to say, the crucial piece of information (the A+ and B- demonstration) was only presented 16 
once and the participants encountered each set of objects only once. Nevertheless, the apes 17 
and 2.5-year-olds discounted the confounded information already in the first trial of the first 18 
test session. Furthermore, the mostly negative results of experiment 2 indicate that using 19 
conditional independence to make retrospective causal judgments might be more difficult for 20 
the apes and 2.5-year-olds. Only by the age of 3 years, we found solid evidence that children 21 
were able to update their causal judgments retrospectively. Experiment 3 suggests, however, 22 
that apes do succeed on retrospective discounting (but not backward blocking) tasks when 23 
they observe the effects of their own interventions. The pattern of findings of experiment 1 24 
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and 3 suggests that a simple avoidance strategy was insufficient to account for apes’ 1 
performance. Finally, experiment 4 showed that apes’ choices and error corrections were 2 
modulated by the spatial relationship between the apparatus and the objects.   3 
The fact that apes and children were able to differentiate between completely novel 4 
objects based on patterns of conditional independence after a single demonstration shows that 5 
they learn novel causal structures very efficiently. A purely associative explanation for the 6 
current findings on apes’ and children’s sensitivity to conditional independence are cue 7 
competition effects such as forward blocking (Kamin, 1969) and protection from 8 
overshadowing (Blaisdell, Bristol, Gunther, & Miller, 1998). Kamin found that the 9 
conditioning of an association between a conditioned stimulus (CS, e.g. tone) and an 10 
unconditioned stimulus (US, e.g. food) is inhibited by the presence of a second CS (e.g. a 11 
light) which has already been associated with the US before, a phenomenon known as 12 
forward blocking. Accordingly, in the one-cause condition the participants might have learnt 13 
by classic conditioning during the (single) A+ demonstration to expect food when object A is 14 
inserted. In the two subsequent AB+ demonstrations, the established association between A 15 
and the activation of the detector might have “blocked” the conditioning of the association 16 
between object B and the activation of the detector. In addition, it is possible that the B- 17 
demonstration might have led to latent inhibition of object B which, in turn, protected object 18 
A from overshadowing effects during AB+ demonstrations (Beckers et al., 2009). Both of 19 
these cue competition effects might have yielded stronger associations of object A (relative to 20 
object B) with the activation of the detector in the one-cause condition as compared to the 21 
two-cause condition. However, forward blocking or protection from overshadowing effects 22 
by latent inhibition are usually based on multiple exposures to the precondition trials (A+ or 23 
B-) CS in nonhuman animals (e.g. in the study by Blaisdell et al., 1998, rats received 120 24 
latent inhibition presentations, B-, before they were presented with the overshadowing trials, 25 
CAUSAL LEARNING IN GREAT APES AND CHILDREN 41 
 
AB+). There are some reports on one-trial blocking in rats (e.g., Azorlosa & Cicala, 1986; 1 
Dickinson, Nicholas, & Mackintosh, 1983; Gillan & Domjan, 1977). However, “one-trial” 2 
refers here to a single presentation of compound trials (AB+) but multiple preconditioning 3 
trials (A+). Moreover, this type of one-trial blocking is found in specific contexts such as 4 
taste aversion and fear conditioning. The current findings differ markedly from these 5 
instances: “blocking” occurs after only a single exposure to the preconditioning stimulus 6 
(A+) in a foraging context and the apes produced their own interventions on the apparatus on 7 
the basis of the observed patterns of evidence. Likewise, the fact that 3-year-olds and apes 8 
succeed in the retrospective discounting (or recovery from overshadowing) condition but not 9 
in the backward blocking condition is not expected on the basis of associative models of cue 10 
competition effects.  11 
Therefore, the current findings raise the possibility that these associative cue 12 
competition processes work on different time scales in great apes as compared to rats for 13 
instance. However, simple stimulus-outcome association tasks using, for example, token-14 
exchange paradigms (in which subjects need to learn that tokens with certain perceptual 15 
features, unlike others, are rewarded) provided no evidence that nonhuman apes are 16 
characterized by particularly fast associative learning rates (e.g. Hanus & Call, 2011; Pelé, 17 
Dufour, Thierry, & Call, 2009; Schrauf & Call, 2009; see also Call, 2006). Alternatively, 18 
apes’ performance in the current task might be based on qualitatively different, inferential 19 
reasoning processes.  20 
In human children, the results of the blicket detector paradigm have been explained by 21 
the integration of patterns of correlations into directed causal maps (Gopnik et al., 2004). A 22 
major advantage of such a representation is that it can explain sensitivity to conditional 23 
independence and the ability to predict the effects of one’s own interventions. In the context 24 
of the blicket detector paradigm, Gopnik and colleagues (2001) have shown in a follow-up 25 
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experiment that 3- and 4-year-old children were also able to use information about 1 
conditional probabilities to invent a novel intervention on the detector. Future studies might 2 
elucidate whether apes, like human children, are also able to craft novel interventions in order 3 
to deliberately resolve ambiguous causal structures. Similar to the findings with rats 4 
(Blaisdell, Sawa, Leising, & Waldmann, 2006) and children (e.g., Schulz, Gopnik, & 5 
Glymour, 2007), it will be an interesting question for future research whether apes might also 6 
use their interventions to distinguish between more complex causal structures such as 7 
common cause and causal chain models.  8 
Irrespective of the precise learning algorithm, apes and children preferred evidence 9 
generated by unconfounded interventions (i.e., manipulating a single variable) rather than 10 
confounded interventions (i.e., manipulating multiple variables simultaneously). Only the 11 
former provide evidence for an unconditional dependence between the manipulated variable 12 
and the observed effect. Unconfounded interventions are, therefore, crucial for inferring 13 
causal structures (Woodward, 2011). Woodward differentiates between different sources of 14 
information for making causal judgments: own interventions, other agents’ interventions, and 15 
observed covariation. All three sources of information, however, may be interpreted in a 16 
counterfactual way; that is, as what would happen if someone was intervening on the task at 17 
hand. In the current study, apes efficiently learned causal structures based on own 18 
interventions supporting Penn and Povinelli’s notion (2007) that great apes explicitly 19 
represent causal relations between own actions and their effects. However, apes also learned 20 
causal relations from observing other agents’ interventions. Whether apes, like humans, also 21 
distinguish between conditional and unconditional dependencies between events based on 22 
observed covariation information alone (i.e. without any agent involved, cf. the wind example 23 
from the beginning) is unclear to date and should be addressed by future research.  24 
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Our findings might be particularly relevant for the acquisition of tool-use in great apes. 1 
Causal learning might be the cognitive ability that sets tool-users apart from non-tool-users. 2 
In contrast to recent findings with New Caledonian crows (Taylor et al., 2014) , great apes 3 
produced causal interventions based on sparse observational evidence. However, as 4 
mentioned before it is still unclear whether the poor performance of NC crows is related to 5 
this particular task or is indicative of a deeper limitation in producing and learning from 6 
causal interventions (Jacobs et al., 2015). Future studies should be aimed at systematically 7 
comparing tool-using and non-tool-using species on causal learning and intervention tasks 8 
such as the blicket detector paradigm. 9 
Finally, the current findings also link with the literature on social learning in great apes. 10 
Nonhuman apes seem to learn from others predominately by means of emulation (i.e. 11 
copying environmental results, end states, or goals) rather than by imitating others’ actions 12 
(e.g., Call, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2005; Horner & Whiten, 2005; Tennie, Call, & 13 
Tomasello, 2006; Tennie, Call, & Tomasello, 2010; Tomasello, Davis-Dasilva, & Camak, 14 
1987). For emulation learning, identifying causally relevant interventions is crucial as it 15 
allows individuals to reproduce an effect in the environment without copying the exact 16 
actions of a model. Imitation, in contrast, works even without any knowledge about the task-17 
relevant contingencies. Our results support the emulation account by demonstrating how apes 18 
identify causally relevant interventions when they observe another agent’s actions by 19 
discounting confounded ones. 20 
In summary, the current study provides evidence that apes, like preschoolers, are able 21 
to make accurate causal judgments based on sparse observational evidence of patterns of 22 
variation and covariation under some circumstances. Candidate explanations for apes’ 23 
performance are cue competition effects as well as inferential reasoning processes. Apes and 24 
children made these causal judgments after only a single exposure to the task-relevant 25 
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contingencies, which makes associative cue competition effects (such as blocking) appear 1 
less likely. Instead, inferential reasoning processes might be at work here. However, this 2 
tentative conclusion awaits further confirmation by future research.  3 
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